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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Corey Young appeals following the district court’s order denying his motion for
credit for time served. Mr. Young asserts that the district court erred in denying him
credit for pre-judgment incarceration on two additional counts where the district court
erroneously found State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 6 (2015) (holding I.C. § 18-309 requires
courts to credit a defendant with prejudgment incarceration served on each count), was
inapplicable to Mr. Young’s case as such application would be retroactive. This was
error as Mr. Young’s motion for credit did not call for collateral review or retroactive
application.1 Although the Owens Court noted that its holding would not be applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review, Mr. Young’s motion for credit was made
through I.C.R. 35(c), which provides that such a motion can be made at any time. In
that way, an I.C.R. 35(c) motion is more ministerial, as it corrects a mathematical error
in the judgment of conviction. Where Mr. Young’s appeal of the district court’s denial of
his motion for credit was timely from the district court’s corrected order, the issue comes
before this Court on direct review, and the district court’s denial was error.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 25, 2012, officers responded to a residence in which Corey
Young had initially been invited, but had worn out his welcome and been asked to

1

This issue was recently addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in State v.
Young, 2017 Opinion No. 1 (Ct. App. Jan.11, 2017). This opinion is not yet final as a
petition for review was filed by the appellant with the Idaho Supreme Court on
January 31, 2017. Should the Court grant review of the pending Petition, Mr. Young
asks the Court to also retain this case.
1

leave. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),2 p.7.) When Mr. Young’s
ride arrived, the driver of the car, Brian Mack, entered the home and pointed a gun in
the direction of one of the residence’s occupants. (PSI, pp.7, 12.) Mr. Mack took a
television from the residence and put it in his trunk, and he and Mr. Young left the
residence. (PSI, pp.7, 12.) The occupants called 911. (PSI, p.7.) When officers
responded and attempted to locate the suspect vehicle, the car pulled over but
Mr. Young exited the vehicle and ran away from the officers.3 (PSI, p.7.) He entered a
home, then took a truck without permission and drove away while the officers pursued
him. (PSI, pp.7, 12.) Eventually the officers employed spike strips and Mr. Young
crashed the truck. (PSI, p.7.) He got out of the truck and ran again, but this time he
stopped and allowed himself to be arrested when he reached a canal full of water. (PSI,
p.7.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Young was charged by information with robbery, felony
destruction of evidence, burglary, grand theft, and felony eluding.

(R., pp.58-60.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Young pled guilty to burglary, grand theft and felony
eluding. (R., pp.85-93.) In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the
remaining counts, to not file a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, and to
recommend an aggregate unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, to be
served concurrently. (R., pp.85-93.)

2

The designation “PSI” shall refer to the pages of the electronic file containing the
Presentence Investigation Report as well as all attachments such as substance abuse
evaluations, police reports, and letters in support of Mr. Young. The PSI page numbers
correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file.
3
Mr. Young was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time, and was
experiencing extreme paranoia, and was fearful first that Mr. Mack would shoot him,
and then fearful that the police would shoot him. (PSI, p.12.)
2

On the burglary charge, the district court imposed a fixed sentence of four years.
(R., p.99.) On the grand theft charge, the district court imposed a sentence of fourteen
years, with one year fixed, consecutive to the burglary sentence. (R., p.99.) On the
felony eluding charge the district court imposed a sentence of two years, indeterminate,
consecutive to the burglary and grand theft charges. (R., p.99.) The district court
ordered the sentences into execution, for an aggregate unified sentence of twenty
years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.98-100.) The district court gave Mr. Young 157
days of credit for time served. (R., p.99.)
In 2015, Mr. Young filed a pro se Motion for Credit for Time Served and a
supporting affidavit. (R., pp.136-144.) Mr. Young asked for credit for the pre-judgment
time he spent in custody. (R., p.136.) Mr. Young submitted an affidavit in which he
averred that he was held on all counts for 157 days but only credited with 157 days on
one count, and was therefore entitled to an additional 314 days.

(R., p.139.)

He

requested the 314 days asserting he was, pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision in Owens, entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration on all counts, even if
the sentences were ordered to be consecutive. (R., pp.138-139.) On December 23,
2015, the district court denied the motion without a hearing, holding that the Owens
decision was not retroactive, and Mr. Young was only entitled to 94 days of credit for
time served.4 (R., pp.149-152.) The district court issued a corrected order on July 21,

4

The district court incorrectly calculated and entered an order denying credit which
analyzed the facts and circumstances in a different case involving Mr. Young.
(R., pp.126-127.) The court corrected the facts and credit calculation of the erroneous
Order in a “Corrected Order Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served,” filed on
July 21, 2016. (R., pp.151-152.)

3

2016, which denied Mr. Young the 314 days of credit for time served pre-judgment.
(R., pp.151-152.)
Mr. Young filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s
order. (R., pp.153-157.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Young’s motion for credit for time served?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Young’s Motion For Credit For Time
Served
A.

Introduction
Mr. Young asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. Mr. Young is entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration on
all three of his sentences. Mr. Young asserts that, because the facts in the record
clearly establish he is owed an additional 157 days of credit for each of the two charges
for which he was incarcerated prior to his conviction, the district court erred in denying
his motion for credit for time served. He respectfully requests that this Court order that
he be given credit for time served in the amount of 314 days, 157 days for each of the
two cases on which he received no credit.

B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Young’s Motion For Credit For Time
Served
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion

to correct the calculation of credit at any time; thus, the time the judgment is entered or
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executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation. I.C.R. 35(c).
Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has made clear, “the language of I.C. § 18-309 is
mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this case)
when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court give the
appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). “This
means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as defined
by the statute. Id.
Idaho Code Section 18–309 governs when credit must be given for both pre- and
post-judgment incarceration, and provides, in relevant part:
(1) In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. . .
I.C. § 18-309(1). The language of I.C. § 18–309 entitles a defendant to credit for “any
period of incarceration” and, notably, does not base credit on any factor other than
actual incarceration “for the offense or an included offense.”

The Idaho Court of

Appeals has explained, “[t]he directive of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory, specifying that a
person shall receive credit.” State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
In State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
plain language of Idaho Code section 18-309 requires the court to credit a defendant
“for time served on each of his offenses, whether to be served concurrently or
consecutively.” Id. at 4. In Owens, five months after the judgment of conviction was
entered, Mr. Owens filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c) seeking credit for time
served for all of the charges for which he was incarcerated prior to the entry of
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judgment.5 Id. at 2-3. He asserted that he was statutorily entitled to the credit on each
of his consecutive counts and that the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hoch,
102 Idaho 351 (1981), was manifestly wrong and should be overruled. Id. at 3. After
the district court denied the motion, Mr. Owens timely appealed. Id. The Owens Court
granted relief on direct appeal from the denial of the Rule 35(c) motion for credit for time
served. The Owens Court agreed with Mr. Owens, finding that the statutory language
was unambiguous and its decision in Hoch was manifestly wrong, overruling that
decision “to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law.” Owens, 158 Idaho at 6. The
Owens Court found that courts had been erroneously interpreting I.C. § 18-309 since
1981, but it corrected the previous error by overruling wrongly decided precedent and
awarding the proper credit to Mr. Owens. Id. at 3-5.
The Court granted Mr. Owens the relief he sought, but included a section in the
opinion which cautioned that this new interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 would not be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

Id. at 6-7.

The Owens Court

analyzed the retroactivity of its decision using Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), for
criminal cases on collateral review. Owens, 158 Idaho at 6.
The Court found:
The threshold question in applying the Teague test is whether a case
announces a new rule. See State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 505
(Wyo.2014). Generally a case announces a new rule “when it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation” on states. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301,
109 S.Ct. at 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d at 349. In other words, “a case announces
a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final.” Id. (emphasis in original). We
have never before interpreted Idaho Code section 18–309 as adding credit
5

To the extent the Court’s Opinion in Owens may not contain a clear reference to the
criminal rule pursuant to which Mr. Owens sought relief, Mr. Young asks this Court to
take judicial notice of the record and appellate briefing in Owens.
8

for time served to each consecutive count in a judgment. Because we are
now interpreting section 18–309 in a way that was not dictated by
precedent, this case announces a new rule.
Id.

The Owens Court held that it would apply its new interpretation of the plain

language of I.C. § 18-309 “only prospectively and to cases now on direct review.” Id. at
7.
A defendant’s appeal from the denial of a motion for credit for time served is not
a case on “collateral review.” Like the defendant in Owens, Mr. Young timely appealed
from the denial of his motion for credit for time served. In denying Mr. Young’s motion,
the district court noted that in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 7 (2015), “the [Idaho]
Supreme Court stated ‘[W]e apply this Court’s new interpretation of Idaho Code section
18-309’s plain language only prospectively and to cases now on direct review.’”
(R., p.152.)

The district court also noted that the application of State v. Owens to

Mr. Young’s case would be retroactive. (R., p.152.) The district court concluded that
retroactive application of State v. Owens to Mr. Young’s case was not permissible under
Owens. (R., p.152.)
While the Owens Court did say that its holding will not be applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review, I.C.R. 35(c) provides that a motion may be filed “at any
time”, thus, the credited time may be directly raised to the district court at any time. A
direct appeal from a denial of motion for credit for time served is not a case on
“collateral review,” thus the district court erred in using a retroactivity analysis.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines “collateral” as follows:
1. Supplementary; accompanying, but secondary and subordinate to
“whether the accident victim was wearing a seat belt is a collateral issue.”
2. Not direct in line, but on a parallel or diverging line of descent; of,
relating to, or involving a person who is related by blood but is neither an
ancestor nor a descendant “an uncle is in a collateral, not a direct, line.”
9

COLLATERAL, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously defined “collateral” to mean postconviction, or habeas proceedings. See Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 419 (1991)
(explaining the difference between whether a new rule of law will apply either to “to a
convicted defendant whose status is yet pending on direct appeal, or, to equally extend
that new rule to a defendant whose case is closed as to the direct appeal, but is yet
subject to collateral appeal, i.e., a defendant’s action against the state seeking postconviction relief from all or part of the judgment rendered against him.”); see also Ex
parte Olsen, 74 Idaho 400, 403 (1953) (comparing the function of a writ of habeas
corpus “as a means of collateral attack upon a judgment or process which is absolutely
void,” to the function of “proceeding for the review of errors committed by a trial court
within its jurisdiction.”); but c.f. O’Neill v. Potvin, 13 Idaho 721, ___, 93 P. 20, 21 (1907)
(defining “collateral attack” in an action to quiet a title whereby “the attack upon a
judgment is collateral if the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and
contemplates some other relief or result than the mere setting aside of the judgment,
although the setting aside of the judgment may be necessary to secure such
independent purpose.”). However, the O’Neill Court’s explanation of a “collateral attack”
does not encompass a credit for time served motion because it is just another motion in
the same, ongoing case and is not an “action or proceeding” with an “independent
purpose.” 13 Idaho at 21.
Thus, an appeal from an order denying a motion for credit for time served is one
of direct review, as the credit for time served is never a final determination where the
rule allows for adjustment at any time. Because there is no provision providing that the

10

district court may only calculate the appropriate amount of credit for time served when
entering a judgment, whether an original judgment or an order revoking probation, the
Idaho Criminal Rule allowing a motion to be made for a credit calculation at any time is
both necessary and consistent. See I.C.R. 33(b); see also I.C. § 19-2519.
To deny all of the defendants the credit to which the Idaho Legislature has
deemed they are legally entitled to is wrong, particularly in light of the fact that Owens
was just such a case. In Owens, five months after the time to appeal the judgment of
conviction had passed, Mr. Owens filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c) seeking credit
for time served for all of the charges for which he was incarcerated prior to the entry of
judgment.6

Owens, 158 Idaho at 2-3.

While the Owens Court saw fit to correct

Mr. Owens’ case, it prohibited retroactive application of the new rule to cases on
collateral review, but did not address the fact that cases could potentially come before it
on direct review and in exactly the same procedural posture as Mr. Owens’ case—those
on appeal from the denial of a I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served. Id. at 6-7.
Notably, the Owens Court never classified Mr. Owens’ case as being before it on
collateral review; instead, the Court’s concern was with making sure the problematic
precedent was overruled and that the affected defendants received the credit which the
Legislature had deemed them entitled to. Id.
Refusing to apply the plain language of a statute to Mr. Young’s case simply
because his case was not on direct review at the time of the Court’s decision in Owens

To the extent the Court’s Opinion in Owens may not contain information as to precisely
how many months had passed from the date the district entered the Judgment of
Conviction to the date Mr. Owens filed his motion for credit for time served, Mr. Young
asks this Court to take judicial notice of the record and appellate briefing in Owens.

6
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would be manifestly unfair. In 1972, the Idaho Legislature enacted a law providing that
defendants shall receive credit for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment,
which necessarily included consecutively sentenced defendants such as Mr. Young.
See I.C. § 18-309 (18-309, added 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 858; am. 1972, ch. 381, sec.
7, p. 1102). Ultimately, the Owens Court held that it had been erroneously interpreting
the relevant statute for the last thirty-five (or more) years. Denying Mr. Young credit for
time he spent incarcerated on all counts works a fundamental injustice—he was denied
credit essentially because the Owens Court chose to state, in dicta, that the new
interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 would only be applied to cases on direct review,
presumably because it believed it would be too burdensome for district courts to
recalculate pre-judgment credit for time served owed to the small number of defendants
still incarcerated with consecutive sentences. Such an arbitrarily limited application
would unnecessarily punish Mr. Young by treating him differently from those defendants
who had the good fortune of being similarly sentenced after the Owens decision was
rendered or whose cases were currently on direct appeal when the Owens decision was
published.
Ultimately, the district court never loses jurisdiction to correct the amount of credit
for time served that the defendant is owed because the award of credit is mandatory.
See State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). This makes sense because a
motion for credit for time served is not a collateral attack on a conviction, and is,
essentially, handled as a ministerial matter—a continuation of the case by means of
correction of a previous mistake—and not as a decision which would necessarily impact

12

the finality of the conviction. In that way an I.C.R. 35(c) motion is more ministerial, as it
corrects a mathematical error in the judgment of conviction.
Further, in situations where the defendant is sentenced to the statutory maximum
but did not receive credit for time they were incarcerated pre-judgment, and who served
the entire sentence without parole, the sentence would be illegal because they will
serve more than the statutory maximum. I.C.R. 35(a); State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho
895 (Ct. App. 1991). Such a situation was recently recognized by the Idaho Court of
Appeals. State v. Martin, 159 Idaho 860, 367 P.3d 255, 259 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding
that the Owens Court decided the underlying illegality argument in the defendant's
“motion for credit for time served,” thus the Court in Owens effectively treated the
defendant's motion as one made pursuant to Rule 35(a)).
Here, Mr. Young’s motion for credit for time served was filed on December 1,
2015, and, at the time the district court denied the credit motion, the district court had
jurisdiction. Now, on direct appeal of the district court’s denial of the motion for credit
for time served, the issue of whether the district court properly credited Mr. Young will
be directly reviewed. The Owens decision applies to the facts of Mr. Young’s case and
he is entitled to credit for time served on all three counts. Because Mr. Young is entitled
to credit for all of the time he was incarcerated, the district court erred in denying his
motion for credit for time served.

13

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Young respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 314 days.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2017.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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